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SYNERGIES, RISKS AND THE REGULATION
OF STOCK EXCHANGE INTERCONNECTION
by
JOSEPH LEE*
In this  article,  the author  discusses  the phenomenon  of stock  exchange
interconnection and the synergies that  it  can bring. He investigates  the methods
and rationales  behind  various  models  currently  employed  such  as the Euronext
virtual model, the integration between the London Stock Exchange and the Milan
Stock  Exchange,  and the ASEAN model  in Asia.  Despite  the fact  that  there  are
many models of interconnection, none of them are truly interconnected in that they
share  a common  trading  platform,  a single  clearing  house,  and a single  central
securities  depository.  Divergence  in national  law  remains  a major  obstacle
to interconnection.  This  is  because,  notwithstanding  a certain  degree
of harmonisation achieved in jurisdictions such as the EU, national laws continue
to play  an important  role  in regulating  financial  market  infrastructure  such
as stock  exchanges.  Therefore,  without  a clear  regime  governing  jurisdiction
and applicable law, true interconnection is unlikely to be achieved.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As global financial markets have become increasingly interconnected, stock
exchanges have followed suit  by connecting their  operations  at the cross-
-border  level  to benefit  from increased  demand for cross-border  securities
services.  To provide some examples, Euronext,  a pan-European exchange,
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connects  five  Eurozone  markets:  Paris,  Amsterdam,  Brussels,  Lisbon,
and London.1 The London  Stock  Exchange  and Borsa  Italiana  (the Milan
Stock  Exchange)  have  come  together  under  the umbrella  of the London
Stock Exchange Group (LSEG),  which has been the fifth-largest exchange
in the world by market capitalisation since 2008. In the derivatives market,
Eurex,  Deutsche  Börse’s  derivatives  exchange,  has  launched  a common
trading  platform  with the Korean  Stock  Exchange  (KRX)  to trade
derivatives on both markets.2 In the Far East, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
(SSE)  is  now  connected  to the Hong  Kong  Stock  Exchange  (HKEX)
for certain equities,  allowing investors in the two jurisdictions to purchase
shares directly across borders.3 Singapore is leading the ASEAN countries
in integrating  their  markets.4 Taiwan  has  established  a trade  link
with Singapore,  allowing  investors  to place  orders  through  the Taiwan
Stock  Exchange  (TWSE)  to trade  securities  listed  on the Singapore  Stock
Exchange.5 The EU  Commission  has  long  advocated  single  clearing
and settlement  to connect  exchange-trading  platforms.
The Target2Securities (T2S) project of the European Central Bank (ECB) has
also  linked  European  central  securities  depositaries  (CSDs)  to facilitate
cross-border securities services.
As market  interconnection  promotes  the free  flow  of capital,  goods,
services,  and human  capital  across  national  borders,  exchange
interconnection  also  increases  the flow of securities  and financial  services
and reduces market fragmentation. These exchange interconnections (as is
1 Euronext  London,  a UK  licenced  exchange  operator,  is  also  a member  of Euronext
and performs  listing  services  in London.  See  Euronext.  (2017)  Euronext  London.  [online]
Euronext.  Available  from: https://www.euronext.com/nl/listings/euronext-london
[Accessed 20 September 2017].
2 The London Stock Exchange is connected to the Oslo Exchange. See London Stock Exchange
Group. (2017)  Norwegian Equity  Derivatives. [online]  London Stock Exchange Group plc.
Available  from:  http://www.lseg.com/derivatives/lsedm/products/equity-derivatives/
norwegian-equity-derivatives [Accessed 20 September 2017].
3 HKEX–SSX Stock Connect.  (2017).  [online] Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited.
Available from: http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/csm/index.htm# [Accessed 20 September 2017].
4 Grant,  J.  (2015)  Singapore  urges  closer  ASEAN  markets  integration.  Financial  Times.
Available  from:  https://www.ft.com/content/50d42aa6-10d1-11e5-9bf8-00144feabdc0
[Accessed  20 September 2017];  See  also  Wan,  W.  (2017)  Cross-Border  Public  Offering
of Securities  in Fostering  an Integrated  ASEAN  Securities  Market:  The Experiences
of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Capital Markets Law Journal, 12 (3), pp. 381–411.
5 Regarding the TWSE–SGX stock connection, See Singapure Exchange. (2016)  Taiwan Stock
Exchange and Singapore Exchange Sign Strategic Partnership Agreement, TWSE Subsidiary to Join
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the case for market interconnection) combine the different systems in which
they  operate  into an interactive  mode.  In turn,  this  interactive  mode  can
change  not  only  market  practices  and structures  but also  legal
and regulatory systems6 – hence achieving market convergence.
This  article  considers  the rationale,  methods,  risks  and current  legal
and regulatory  framework  for stock  exchange  interconnections.  Firstly,  it
outlines the methods of interconnection.  Secondly, it  discusses the models
of interconnection and identifies the rationale behind some interconnected
models and obstacles to cross-border interconnection. Thirdly, it  examines
the synergies  that  interconnection  can  bring.  Fourthly,  it  considers  some
of the risks  of interconnection  in terms  of market  stability  and market
safety.  Fifthly,  it  discusses  how  law  and regulation,  using  EU  law
as an example, can facilitate interconnection. Finally, it provides an outlook
on the future of stock exchange interconnection.
2. WHAT IS AN INTERCONNECTION?
Interconnection  is  a generic  term  that  covers  mergers,  common  trading
platform  sharing,7 common  clearinghouse  sharing  (such  as the Central
Counter  Party,  CCP)8,  and the use  of a common settlement  facility.  Some
of these  interconnection  methods  have  been  used  to connect  different
markets,  thus  facilitating  cross-border  transactions  (e.g. Euronext’s
Universal  Trading  Platform,  UTP).9 In the derivatives  market,  index
derivatives  products  can  be  traded  across  different  time  zones  through
common  trading  platforms.  For instance,  Eurex  and the KRX  have
pioneered  the trading  of certain  derivative  products  on a shared  trading
platform.10 In addition to these exchange-led interconnections,  dual-listing
methods,11 which  enable  shares  listed  on one  stock  exchange  to be
simultaneously  traded  on another,  have  long  been  used  to forge
6 Legal and regulatory systems also need to change in order to enable interconnections.
7 In the existing practices, many are still operating separately, but with some arrangements,
they achieve the function of interconnections.
8 For instance, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange share the same
clearing house – China Securities Depository and Clearing Co. (CSDC).
9 Euronext’s  Universal  Trading  Platform  See  Euronext.  Universal  Trading  Platform –  New
Trading Safeguards. [online] Euronext. Available from:  https://www.euronext.com/en/node/
11277 [Accessed 23 September 2017].
10 Eurex/KRX  Link  See  Eurex Exchange.  Eurex/KRX  Link. [online]  Available  from:
http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/products/eurex-krx-link
[Accessed 22 September 2017].
11 Dual-listings are not as prevalent as they were.
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interconnections.12 The dual-listing  concept  and method  have  also  been
developed further  for the listing  and trading  of foreign securities  through
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). ETFs allow securities traded on an ‘A’ stock
exchange  to be  packaged  according  to indices  provided  by that  a stock
exchange  into a managed  fund  (normally  a company)  and then  traded
on a ‘B’  exchange,  hence  achieving  interconnections.13 Furthermore,
with distributed  ledger  technologies  (DLTs)  such  as blockchain,
the underlying  technology  of bitcoin,  it  is  assumed  that  applications
of DLTs can create a blockchain network to facilitate securities transfers.14
In this  type of common blockchain  network,  securities  issued in different
markets  can  be  traded  by participants  in a more  secure  and transparent
way. Using the same blockchain network by different stock exchanges can
also facilitate interconnections.15
Each model of interconnection has its own rationale and complex legal
arrangements. Indeed, not all these models have achieved trading synergies
or truly integrated their markets. A detailed examination shows that certain
models of interconnection achieve only organisational  synergy. Therefore,
I question  whether  law  matters  as an obstacle  to or facilitator  of market
interconnections led by exchange operators.
It is therefore necessary to first identify various types of interconnections
(models  and activities)  and their  contexts  (i.e. their  rationales).  Second,
I outline their endogenous synergies and exogenous benefits (i.e. efficiency
to markets)  and risks.  Third,  I  examine  the law  and regulatory
environments  and identify  legal  factors  that  constrain  interconnection.
Fourth,  I  present  my  conclusions  on the need  for a common  method
of addressing risks posed by interconnected markets.
12 Ackerly, D. T. and Pan, E. J. (2002) Dual-listing Securities in Europe and the United States.
In: Sarah  Bolton  (ed.)  The Complete  Guide  to Listing  on London  Stock  Exchange.  Royal
Tunbridge Wells: ISI Publications Ltd.
13 The cross-listing of ETFs is also taking place in the Asia Pacific region. See Jing, L. (2015)
Taiwan–Japan  ETF  Cross-listing  Scheme  Under  Way.  Financial  Times.  Available  from:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f265346-36ac-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html?ft_site=falcon&
desktop=true#axzz4tQzFpt1I  [Accessed  22 September 2017].  Although  ETF  may  not  be
considered  as the same  product  as interconnection,  it  can  also  achieve  the same  effect
of interconnections.
14 Euroclear and Oliver Wyman. (2016)  Blockchain in Capital Markets: the Price and the Journey.
Available from: http://www.dltmarket.com/docs/BlockchainInCapitalMarkets-ThePrizeAnd
TheJourney.pdf [Accessed 22 September 2017].
15 DLT is  largely  focused on post  trade issues  rather  than trading –  questionable  if  this  is
possible in the med term given divergent laws.
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3. INTEGRATED MODELS: INTEGRATION OR NOT?
3.1 MERGER (LSE–BORSA ITALIANA)
The LSEG is a multi-local  exchange in which the London Stock Exchange
(LSE)  and Milan  Stock  Exchange  (Borsa  Italiana)  form  part  of the LSEG.
The group  was  created  through  the 2008  takeover  of the Milan  Stock
Exchange  by the LSE  in the immediate  aftermath  of the financial  crisis.16
After the financial crisis, Italian banks were struggling with cash flows and,
as the shareholders of the non-listed Borsa Italiana,  were keen to sell  their
shares  to the LSE  at a large  premium.17 Presumed  synergies  arose
out of these  trading interconnections  via the same information  technology
infrastructure. The Millennium Exchange, a trading platform tool acquired
by the LSE from a Sri Lankan developer in 2009, was sold to Borsa Italiana
and used for its trading platform.18 Almost a decade later, the Borsa Italiana
and the LSE remain  two  separate  markets  without  any linkages  in terms
of trading, clearing or settlement concerns.19 The main synergy achieved is
at the organisational  level  and is  based  on corporate  restructuring.20
The two markets maintain their trading cycles of listing, trading, clearing,
and settlement.21
This  begs  the question  of why  the LSE  acquired  Borsa  Italiana.
The answer  lies  in Borsa  Italiana’s  MTS  (the wholesale  market
for the government  bonds)  and clearinghouse.22 When  the LSE  acquired
Borsa Italiana, it  did not have its own clearinghouse to clear trades on its
markets.  Hence,  it  was  thought  that  acquiring  Borsa  Italiana  and its
clearinghouse  (CC&G)  would  help  the LSE  Group  develop  a closed-silo
system  that  could  compete  with its  main  rival,  Deutsche  Börse.23
Furthermore, the acquisition of Borsa Italiana prevented Deutsche Börse, its
16 MacDonald, A. (2007) LSE Snags Borsa Italiana, Beating Out NYSE Euronext. The Wall Street
Journal, Eastern Edition, 249 (146).
17 Banker (2007) LSE/Borsa Italiana talks, 157 (997), pp. 14–16.
18 The IT system of the Milan Stock Exchange is the same as the LSE, as it has been developed
by the LSE. This forced Milan to be acquired by the LSE, as Borsa Italiana must upgrade its
IT infrastructure as required by European law.
19 Banker (2007) LSE/Borsa Italiana talks, 157 (977), pp. 14–16.
20 Strategic groups of the two exchanges were combined and the combined strategy group sits
in the group  headquarters  office  in London.  This  has  caused  the Milan  Stock  Exchange
to introduce restructuring programmes that render every one in four employees redundant.
21 It should be noted that the Milan Stock Exchange is the listing authority in Italy, whereas
the Financial  Conduct  Authority,  rather  than  the London  Stock  Exchange,  is  the listing
authority in the UK.
22 Flinders, K. (2008)  London Stock Exchange  Gains  Clearing  Technology.  Computer Weekly,
p. 6.
296 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 11:2
rival operating under a closed-silo model,24 from acquiring this important
continental  European exchange. Despite this  merger within the European
common market, no common trading platform has been established, such
as the Euronext  model’s  UTP.25 Those  opposed  to such  an interconnected
platform  primarily  include  Italian-based  traders,  who  fear  that
an interconnected  trading  platform  based  in London  could  put  them
at a disadvantage  relative  to their  London  counterparts.26 Orders  placed
through Borsa Italiana would be delayed due to distance. Although the LSE
proposed  delaying  orders  placed  by London-based  traders  to level
the playing  field,  Milan  traders  did  not  consider  this  a sufficient  means
of addressing the latency issue.
The LSE acquired LCH. Clearnet, a merged clearinghouse. Clearnet SA
was created by Euronext, the Paris Stock Exchange.27 To date, there has been
no  consolidation  between  the LSE-owned  CCP,  LCH.  Clearnet
and the Borsa Italiana-owned CC&G. CC&G is not even a CCP that offers
clearing services for trading on the LSE London market for its own clearing
members.  Indeed,  there  is  no  interoperability  between  LCH.  Clearnet
and CC&G.  Moreover,  no  access  has  been  granted  for LCH.  Clearnet
to clear  trade on Borsa  Italiana.  The clearing members  of the two markets
could  have  benefited  from either  more  consolidated  or interoperable
clearing services. Furthermore, the settlement of trade in the Italian markets
was  carried  out  by Monte  Titoli,  Borsa  Italiana’s  own  CSD.  In London,
settlement  facilities  were  provided through Euroclear  London & Ireland,
a subsidiary  of Euroclear  SA.  In Milan,  Monte  Titoli,  a subsidiary
23 Deutsche Börse operates a closed-silo model, which through subsidiaries executes the entire
trading  cycle  of listing,  trading,  clearing  and settlement;  See  also  a description
of the background  market  prior  to the 2008  LSE–BI  merger  in Zwick,  S.  (2006)  Futures:
News, Analysis & Strategies for Futures, Options & Derivatives Traders, 35 (4), p. 14.
24 Köppl, T. V. and Monnet, C. (2007) Guess What: It’s the Settlements! Vertical Integration
as a Barrier  to Efficient  Exchange  Consolidation.  Journal  of Banking  & Finance,  31  (10),
pp. 3013–3033.
25 Euronext. Universal Trading Platform – New Trading Safeguards. [online] Euronext. Available
from:  https://www.euronext.com/en/node/11277  [Accessed  23 September 2017];  See  also
Pownall,  G.,  Vulcheva,  M.  and Wang,  X.  (2014)  The Ability  of Global  Stock  Exchange
Mechanisms to Mitigate Home Bias: Evidence from Euronext.  Management  Science,  60 (7),
pp. 1655–1676.
26 Murray,  H.,  Pham,  T.  P.  and Singh,  H.  (2016)  Latency  Reduction  and Market  Quality:
The Case  of the Australian  Stock  Exchange.  International  Review  of Financial  Analysis, 46,
pp. 257–265.
27 See  History  of LCH.Clearnet.  Clearing  houses  have  been  subject  to M&A  activities
in the exchange industry. When LCH was acquired by Clearnet, the LSE also challenged its
independence,  as Clearnet  was  a Euronext  subsidiary.  See  (2003)  Entente  peu  cordiale.
Economist.  [online]  Available  from: http://www.economist.com/node/1883659  [Accessed
23 September 2017]
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of the Milan Stock Exchange,  provides settlement functions.  Such vertical
operations  (the so-called  vertical  silo)  for servicing  the entire  lifecycle
of the securities trade act as an obstacle to horizontal integration,28 as Monti
Titoli is unlikely to be consolidated with other CSD such as Euroclear.
3.2 VIRTUAL EURONEXT INTERCONNECTIONS
Euronext  is  the first  pan-European exchange  network  to link  five  equity
markets:  Paris,  Amsterdam,  Brussels,  Lisbon,  and London.29 In 2014,
Euronext  London  received  approval  from the UK  regulator  to tap
into London’s  international  financial  market  by providing  an entry  point
for international investors to access its deep liquidity pool obtained through
interconnected markets.
Under  this  model,  the five  markets  remain  as different  listing  venues
with a common trading platform.30 That said, each market retains its home
trading  platform.  For instance,  a Belgian  company  does  not  need  to go
to Paris  for its  shares  to be  admitted  to trade  (listing)  and to be  traded
on the Euronext UTP. Permission to trade is granted by Euronext Brussels,
and shares  are  traded  on the same  platform,  which  is  achieved  through
the harmonised single order book. A Belgian investor can purchase French
securities by placing an order on the Euronext Brussels that will be routed
to UTP.  Similarly,  a seller  based  in Lisbon  can  place  an order  through
Euronext Lisbon to sell Dutch securities that can be matched via a buy order
placed through Euronext Paris.
The clearing function is performed by Clearnet SA, a subsidiary of LCH.
Clearnet. The settlement of securities is performed by the Euroclear for each
of these  markets.  There  is  no  common  settlement  facility  for this
interconnected  market  because  issuing  companies  and investors  prefer
national securities to be deposited in their own countries, and currently, no
law exists that can safely manage legal risks posed by depositing securities
outside of the jurisdiction in which securities are issued.
28 Köppl, T. V. and Monnet, C. (2007) Guess What: It’s the Settlements! Vertical Integration
as a Barrier  to Efficient  Exchange  Consolidation.  Journal  of Banking  & Finance,  31  (10),
pp. 3013–3033.
29 Because our scale  and single  order book model  is  constructed on a Pan-European basis,
Euronext represents the deepest source of liquidity in Europe. Higher liquidity levels lead
to higher trading levels or stock velocity, tighter spreads on the buying and selling of shares
and lower share price volatility. These key factors are crucial in terms of attracting global
investors.
30 However, the local rules of each market still apply.
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In this  manner,  the governing  law  on trade  will  depend
on the nationality  of the securities  involved.  An order  placed  through
the Paris market to purchase a Belgian security will be governed by Belgian
law.  Members  of the five  exchanges  are  mutually  recognised:  a member
of one of the five  markets can place orders in the others.  Because  there is
a common  trading  platform  operating  in parallel  with domestic  trading
platforms,  market conduct  issues  can be regulated by national  regulators
who  permit  securities  access  to trading.  However,  a college  of regulators
establishes  policy  criteria.  A market  surveillance  team based  at Euronext
Paris  identifies  market  misconduct  such  as market  abuse  and breaches
of market rules. This model serves as the best example of interconnections
that allow for exchanges within the network to continue to operate within
their own market.
In practice,  however, such a model can reduce the functions of smaller
exchanges in the interconnected network. The Lisbon exchange had roughly
70 personnel and had roughly 10 remained in 2016. If regional development
is a factor to consider in an interconnection model, some revisions may be
needed to improve it.
3.3 ASEAN EXCHANGE INTERCONNECTIONS
In Asia,  stock  exchange  interconnections  are  not  common.  The domestic
laws  and capital  market  rules  among  the largest  stock  exchanges
— the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX), Korea Stock Exchange (KRX), and Taiwan
Stock  Exchange  (TWSE)  —  remain  very  different.  There  is  no  regional
consensus  on standards  in terms  of listing  prospectuses,  disclosure
obligations, or cross-border enforcement. As a result, Asian capital markets
remain  fragmented,  and there  have  been  no  significant  developments
in terms  of creating  a common  legal  framework  for financial  market
infrastructures.  Cross-border  securities  transactions  rely  heavily
on intermediaries, increasing transaction costs.
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Singapore has taken the lead in terms of forging the ASEAN Exchange
interconnections  that  connect  Singapore,  Thailand,  and Malaysia.31
The three  countries  have  signed  an agreement  to create  a Trans-Tasman
Mutual  Recognition  of Securities  Offerings  (MRSO)  regime,  whereby
companies  complying  with the agreed-upon  prospectus  regime  can  have
their  shares  traded  on a common  trading  platform.32 Shares  placed
on the Thai  order  book  are  routed  to this  trading  platform  and can  be
matched  by orders  placed  on the Singaporean  order  book.  However,
because  of a lack  of EU-style  legal  regimes  such  as the Prospectus
Directive33 — giving rise to passporting rights34 — and a lack of an effective
college  of regulators,  as is  the case  for Euronext,35 the ASEAN
interconnection  model  has  not  been  successful.  In addition  to a lack
of regulatory  frameworks  that  facilitate  interconnections,  Thailand
and Malaysia  fear  that  such  interconnections  may  cause  liquidity
fragmentation,  limiting  the depth  capital  pool  needed  to support  their
domestic  markets  and raising  the question  of whether  stock  exchange
interconnections reduce the liquidity of less developed exchanges.
31 Implementation  plan  to promote  the development  of an integrated  capital  market
to achieve the objectives of the AEC Blueprint, See ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF).
(2016)  The Implementation  Plan.  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/
report/ImplementationPlan.pdf [Accessed 23 September 2017]; See Park, C.-Y. (2013) Asian
Capital Market Integration: Theory and Evidence. [online] Asia Development Bank Economics
Working  Paper.  Available  from:  http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30284/
ewp-351.pdf  [Accessed 23 September 2017]; See also Stiglitz,  J.  E. (2010) Risk and Global
Economic Architecture: Why Full Financial Integration May Be Undesirable.  The American
Economic Review, 100 (2), pp. 388–390 (pointing out the risks of full integration).
32 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2015)  ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead
Together. [online] The ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta. Available from: http://asean.org/storage/
2015/11/67.-December-2015-ASEAN-2025-Forging-Ahead-Together-2nd-Reprint.pdf
[Accessed 23 September 2017];  See  also  ASEAN Capital  Markets  Forum (ACMF).  (2016)
ACMF  Action  Plan  2016–2020.  [online]  Available  from:  http://www.theacmf.org/ACMF/
upload/acmfactionplan2016-2020.pdf [Accessed 23 September 2017].
33 Directive  2003/71/EC  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 4 November 2003
on the Prospectus to be  Published  when Securities  are  Offered to the Public  or Admitted
to Trading  and Amending  Directive  2001/34/EC.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union
31 December.  Available  from:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/71/oj  [Accessed
23 September 2017];  International  Organization  of Securities  Commissions.  (1998)
International  Disclosure  Standards  for Cross-Border  Offerings  and Initial  Listings  by Foreign
Issuers. [online] Available from: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf
[Accessed 23 September 2017] (non-financial reporting).
34 There is no automatic mutual recognition of prospectus. Approval is still given by national
regulators, and standards may be applied differently by national regulators.
35 There is no supra-national securities agency.
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3.4 TAIWAN–SINGAPORE CONNECTION
Taiwan  is  not  an ASEAN country.  It  has  the fifth-largest  stock  exchange
in Asia  and the 18th largest  stock  exchange  in the world,  measured
by the market  capitalisation  value  of the shares  traded36 as part  of its
in ternationalisation  strategy  to increase  Taiwan  investors’  exposure
to international  markets,  in 2016,  Taiwan  established  a Singapore–Taiwan
Stock  Connect  regime  to allow  investors  in the two  countries  to trade
in securities listed on the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) and the Taiwan
Stock  Exchange  (TWSE).37 The TWSE  created  a subsidiary,  Global  Link
Securities Co.,38 which then became a remote trading member of the SGX.
Within this model, investors in Taiwan can place orders through the TWSE
to trade  in securities  on the SGX.  The original  plan  was  for the SGX
to implement  the same  model,  creating  a subsidiary  that  then  becomes
a remote  member  of the TWSE.  In essence,  this  is  similar  to using  a third
party  broker  obtaining  access  in another  jurisdiction.  However,  this  can
substantially  reduce  the costs  of Taiwan  intermediaries  for connecting
directly  with SGX.  To date,  however,  the connection  is  oriented  only
southward  (the TWSE  to the SGX)  in that  investors  in Taiwan  can  place
orders to trade on the SGX but not vice versa. Listings are controlled by their
respective authorities, and clearings and settlements are performed by their
respective institutions.
This model benefits not only investors in Taiwan in terms of providing
more  investment  targets  but also  broker-dealers  in Taiwan  because
international  investors  can use  the TWSE as a gateway to access  the SGX.
However,  this  model can pose  risks  in terms of retail  investor  protection
and market stability levels. Retail investors in Taiwan may not have access
to direct  legal  services  and enforcement  agencies  in cases  in which  there
have been securities violations by parties based in Singapore. On the issue
of market  stability,  because  the TWSE’s  subsidiary  is  a remote  member
and because  the TWSE  acts  as a guarantee  for its  subsidiary’s  default,
the TWSE has greater exposure to liability.
36 See  the estimation  by StockMarket.com.  (2017).  Taiwan  Stock  Exchange [online]
StockMarketClock.  Available  from:  https://www.stockmarketclock.com/exchanges/twse
[Accessed 23 September 2017].
37 Loh, J. (2016) Taiwan and Singapore Ink Trading Link. Global Capital (1442).
38 See TWSE.  (2016)  Taiwan Stock  Exchange  and Singapore Exchange  sign Strategic  Partnership
Agreement, TWSE subsidiary to join SGX as remote trading member. [press release] 27 January.
Available  from: http://www.twse.com.tw/en/about/press_room/tsec_news_detail.php?id=
18183
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3.5 EUREX–KRX DERIVATIVES INTERCONNECTIONS
Derivatives should be treated differently than equities. Derivatives traded
on exchanges  are  products  devised  from exchanges  such  as Eurex  based
on the  trading  information  of equities  and other  products  listed
on an exchange  such  as Deutsche  Börse  or KRX.  For investors  to be  able
to engage in the trade of derivatives outside  market time,  Eurex and KRX
have  created  a common  platform  for certain  derivatives  to be  traded
without market opening time restrictions.39
3.6 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (ECB) TARGET2SECURITIES (T2S)
T2S, launched by the ECB, is a platform linking European Central Securities
Depositories  for settling  securities  traded  on European  platforms.  T2S
serves  as a single  platform  for settling  securities  trades40 and aims
to harmonise  European  post-trade  practices  based  on barriers  identified
in the Giovannini reports.41 A single settlement platform has been proposed
by the European Commission as a means of reducing settlement costs since
the settlement of securities has been performed by a monopoly of national
CSDs  and,  in some  cases,  by the same  exchange  operator  of a closed-silo
model.  The rationale  for consolidating  CSDs  is  to enable  companies’
securities to be traded on different venues outside of national jurisdictions
and to be  settled  at a lower  cost  outside  of the jurisdiction  in which
securities are issued.42
T2S is  a platform for linking CSDs operations.  In effect,  national CSDs
outsource  their  settlement  processes  to T2S  and focus  on custody
and issuance services.  In addition, CSDs offer other services such as asset
servicing, securities lending, and collateral management data management
(big data) services,43 thus moving up the value chain. With the introduction
39 Eurex/KRX  Link  See  Eurex Exchange.  Eurex/KRX  Link. [online]  Available  from:
http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/products/eurex-krx-link
[Accessed 22 September 2017].
40 Mortensen,  S.  (2015)  Reviewing  the Implementation  of T+2,  the Impact  on the Industry
and What Comes Next (T2S). Journal of Securities Operations & Custody, 7 (4), pp. 312–318.
41 The Giovannini  Group.  (2003)  Second  Report  on EU Clearing  and Settlement  Arrangements.
[online]  Directorate-General  for Economic  and Financial  Affairs,  European  Commission.
Available from: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial markets/docs/clearing/second
_giovannini_report_en.pdf [Accessed 23 September 2017].
42 The securities are still deposited in their national CSDs.
43 (2017) The Custodian-bank Business: A Big Deal Roils the Industry’s Usually Placid Waters.
The Economist.  [online]  Available  from: http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21716051-big-deal-roils-industrys-usually-placid-waters-custodian-bank-
business [Accessed 23 September 2017].
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of the European  Central  Securities  Depository  Regulation  (CSDR),  CSDs
will  have access  to clearinghouses  (CCPs)  and trading  venues,44 meaning
that  clients  will  be  presented  with more  options  when  choosing  a CSD
to settle securities trades.45 In domestic trade, a link between the exchange
and CSD  helps  investors.  However,  in cases  of cross-border  trade,
horizontal integration between CSDs brings the best synergies: full technical
integration  followed  by legal  integration.46 This  is  the rationale  behind
the ECB’s T2S project.
4. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF AN INTERCONNECTION
4.1 TRADING SYNERGIES
Interconnections  enable  two  or more  capital  markets  operated  by stock
exchanges to connect.47 The combination  of two markets  generates  a deep
capital  pool, increasing liquidity.  Liquidity is  a critical  ingredient  of price
discovery  that  is  a function  performed  by the stock  exchange.  Therefore,
interconnections can augment the efficiency of the price discovery function
of exchanges. This is a matter of important social utility in terms of investor
protection.  When  markets  are  fragmented,  there  is  a disparity  in prices,
and investors  may  not  secure  the best  price  available  for the securities
in question,  hence  failing  the best  execution  obligations.  The original  aim
of the EU Best Execution Rule under MiFID I48 was to remediate the problem
of market  fragmentation  resulting  from competition  between  different
trading venues generated through market competition.
For  issuing  companies,  interconnections  increase  their  exposure
to international markets.49 As discussed above, dual-listing methods can be
used  to indirectly  connect  capital  markets  and to increase  companies’
exposure  to individuals  other  than  domestic  investors.  Interconnections
with a common trading platform such as the Euronext UTP grant securities
44 It  is  not  clear  whether  there  will  be  any  meaningful  changes  to the current  market
arrangements.
45 This is at least in theory. However, it will need to be investigated further after the CSDR has
been implemented for a period of time.
46 Tapking,  J.  and Yang,  J.  (2006)  Horizontal  and Vertical  Integration  in Securities  Trading
and Settlement. Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, 38 (7), pp. 1765–1795.
47 See the Euronext UTP for equities and the KRX–Eurex for derivatives.
48 Ferrarini,  G.  and Moloney,  N.  (2012)  Reshaping Order  Execution  in the EU and the Role
of Interest Groups: from MiFID I to MiFID II. European Business Organization Law Review, 13
(4), pp. 557–597.
49 Companies  listed  on the SGX  can  benefit  from Taiwan’s  larger  capital  pool  through
the SGX–TWSE connection.
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listed  on the five  markets  access  to investors  in different  geographic
markets. In the TWSE–SGX southward connection, Singaporean companies
now  have  access  to investors  in Taiwan.  As is  the case  with the ASEAN
model,  Thai  and Malaysian  securities  can  access  international  investors
based  in Singapore.  In the failed  merger  between  the LSE  and Deutsche
Börse,  were  these  two  markets  permitted  to interconnect  to create  one
of the largest  equity  markets  in the world,  securities  arbitrage  caused
by market  fragmentation  could  be  limited,  while  investors’  investment
targets were increased.
The LSE–Borsa  Italiana  merger  did  not  bring  about  such  trading
synergies, as no common trading platform and order routing methods have
been implemented.
4.2 CLEARING SYNERGIES
Transaction costs can be reduced by sharing a common clearing platform.50
For instance,  traders  of numerous  trading  venues  can  use  a single  CCP
to clear  their  trade.  For instance,  Traders  from both  SIX  Swiss  and LSE
or from BATS  Chi–X,  and NSDAQ  OMC  can  choose  a single  CCP  such
as LCH, SIX x-clear or EMCF to clear trades. In Euronext Paris, clearing is
performed by Clearnet SA as the sole CCP. The proposed merger between
LSE  and Deutsche  Börse,  though  failed  to obtain  approval,  would  have
resulted  in clearing  synergies  in which  a single  clearinghouse  can  act
as a CCP  to clear  the trade  of securities  listed  on the two  markets.  Such
synergies  would  substantially  reduce  transaction  costs  since  clearing
represents 40 % of the total trading cost.
A  common  CCP  for different  trading  venues  can  reduce  margins
and collaterals  needed  by traders  operating  in two  markets.  However,
a single  CCP  within  the same  trading  platform  can  increase  costs  due
to a lack  of competition.  This  problem can  be  remedied  by creating  open
access,  as required  under  EMIR  and MIFIR,  to more  clearinghouses.
To create competition, clearinghouses need to create interoperating linkages
so  that  traders  can  choose  their  own  preferred  CCP  to clear  trades.
However,  there  are  concerns  that  such  inter-linkages  can  increase  risks
50 For information on the equities market, see (2011) EMCF Says Yes to CCP Interoperability.
Global Investor. 245, p. 43. For information on the derivative market, see Himaras, E. (2010)
Super–CCP Model Could Spur Interoperability: ISDA. Derivatives Week, p. 15; for a general
analysis,  see  de  Meijer,  C.  (2010)  Are  We  Facing  European  CCP  Interoperability
Regulation?. Journal of Securities Operations & Custody, 3 (1), pp. 55–65.
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of contagion  while  spurring  over-collateralisation.51 These  links  could
spread systemic risk with the bankruptcy of an interconnected CCP, which
could  very  quickly  infect  every  interconnected  entity.52 ECB  acts
as a liquidity  provider  in time  of crisis  and its  location  policy  on the CCP
will affect the ways in which CCPs operate and their interconnections.
5. RISK OF INTERCONNECTIONS
5.1 MARKET STABILITY AND DEFAULT RISK
When  two  markets  are  interconnected  by a common  trading  platform,
default risk can spread across the two markets. Default can occur when one
party fails to fulfil its obligations, creating a blockage in the trading system.
At worst, such a failure to fulfil  trade obligations can cause a run because
another  party’s  trade  depends  on its  completion.  As is  the case
in a securities  market,  having an entity  acting as a CCP in all  transactions
can  mitigate  default  risks.  When  two  exchange-trading  platforms
interconnect, their CCPs must be interoperable to reduce transaction costs,
enabling  their  clearing  members  to trade  on an interconnected  common
trading platform. To manage the default risk spread across the two markets,
CCPs of the interconnected market  must  have 1)  rules dealing with trade
defaults  as an important  risk  management  tool;  2)  a robust  recovery
and resolution regime to address the insolvency of their clearing members;
and 3)  strong  lines  of defence  against  trading  defaults  resulting
from the insolvency  of clearing  members.  Normally,  losses  are  covered
by defaulting  the member’s  own  collateral,  the CCP’s  own  money
and the clearing members’ collective fund.
An interconnected  trading  platform  would  require  the formation
of an interconnected clearing platform by creating an inter-linkage between
CCPs. This type of interoperable linkage is  created when a CCP becomes
a clearing  member  of another  CCP.  Each  interoperable  CCP  provides
collateral  deposited  with a third  party,  i.e. Clearstream  Luxembourg.
Because  the insolvency  of a CCP  will  cause  a systemic  run,  the CCP’s
solvency  requirements,  governance,  and risk  management  with clearing
51 However, in preventing the risk of contagion, an overcollateralization problem may arise.
Mägerle,  J.  and Nellen,  T.  (2011)  Interoperability  Between Central  Counterparties.  Swiss
National Bank Working Papers. 12, pp. 1–28.
52 Farrell,  S.  (2014)  Too  Important  to Fail:  Legal  Complexity  in Planning  for the Failure
of Financial Market Infrastructure. Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation, 29 (8),
pp. 461–470.
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members  through  collateral  provisions  and margin  calls  are  critical
in preventing the CCP’s failure.
Although  competition  between  CCPs  can  reduce  transaction  costs
and thus benefit consumers, such competition can increase insolvency risks
because as smaller CCPs enter the clearing market, dispersed liquidity can
increase the chances of a CCP’s insolvency. A CCP’s insolvency will  affect
other  interoperable  CCPs.  Therefore,  a balance  must  be  struck  between
1) risks  of non-competition  between  CCPs  and 2)  risks  of contagion
resulting  from the insolvency  of an interoperable  CCP.  Another  issue
concerns whether CCP monopolies or oligopolies may create too-big-to-fail
risks and moral hazards through which clearing members or trading venues
fail  to do  their  due diligence  in vetting  the solvency of a CCP.  Therefore,
financial regulators and supervisors should give special attention to a CCP
that is of substantial systemic importance.
5.2 MARKET CONFIDENCE
5.2.1 TRADE TRANSPARENCY
Trading  transparency  facilitates  price  discovery,  a function  of exchanges.
When pre-sale disclosures are not made, such an important function can be
distorted,  rendering  investors  unable  to obtain  the best  price  available.
However,  pre-sale  disclosure  can  disturb  the market  and spread  panic.
For instance,  institutional  investors  engage  in block  trades
and the disclosure  of trades — often at a discount  — to the market  before
execution can influence the market price. However, each country employs
its own rules and positions in dealing with such issues. The UK is in favour
of non-disclosure,  whereas  Germany  and France  are  more  in favour
of transparency.  In the US, it  is  based on a competitive model rather than
the EU style of bulletin board. There are also policy concerns. For instance,
in the fixed-income market, it is said that pre-trade transparency can reduce
liquidity. Therefore, in an interconnected trading platform, a set of common
rules  must  be  in place  to guide  investors.53 In cases  of post-trade
transparency,  a common  trade  repository54 for an interconnected  trading
53 However, one should also consider the specificity of different product markets, i.e.. equities
and bonds; liquid and illiquid markets.
54 For instance, there is the consolidated tape in the EU. See European Securities and Markets
Authority (ESMA). (2017) MiFID II: ESMA Issues Final Specifications for Non-equity Tape Test.
[online]  Available  from: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/mifid-ii-
esma-issues-final-specifications-non-equity-tape [Accessed 23 September 2017].
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platform must be in place to ensure the final price agreed upon to inform
the market.
5.2.2 CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY
Unlike  trade  transparency,  corporate  transparency  requires  companies
to disclose  corporate  information  according  to accounting  standards
and reporting rules.  When standards differ,  investors can lose confidence
in not only the securities in question but also the overall quality of securities
on the market.  When two markets have diverse corporate reporting rules
and different enforcement regimes, investors can have reduced confidence
to trade these securities on an interconnected platform. Moreover, to protect
retail investors, regulators of a market with higher standards may prevent
the market from creating a common trading platform, such as the Euronext
UTP, to trade the securities of another market that maintains less stringent
corporate  reporting  standards.  This  problem  is  also  seen  in cross-listing
cases in which company’s shares are listed and traded on several markets.
The company may make a disclosure to its competent authority, however,
fail to make the similar disclosure to that of another. This can happen when
disclosure  rules  differ  in the two markets  or the authorities  take  different
approaches to corporate transparency. In extreme cases, a company shares
can be suspended from trading by the decision of the competent authority
due to lack of transparency, while shares continue to be traded on another.
This  shows  that  a lack  of regulatory  convergence  and regulatory
collaboration  can  lead  to damages  to investors.  Such  a risk  will  reduce
the willingness to engage in cross-border trade.
Furthermore,  investors  need  to receive  notices  to be  able  to exercise
corporate  actions  in a timely  manner.  How  should  the investor  receive
information at the cross-border level? Who are the actual investors entitled
to hold  the issuing  companies  to accountable  for the loss  of entitlements?
How are the language and tax barriers to be overcome? There are different
ways  as to how  the intermediaries  such  as custodian  banks  operate
to facilitate  corporate  actions.  Without  a harmonised  approach,  there  is
a risk  that  the investor  will  not  be  protected  in relation  to their  legal
and economic entitlements.
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5.2.3 BEST EXECUTION RULE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Investment banks and brokers may hold securities themselves. When they
act on behalf of their investor clients to purchase securities, they may obtain
securities not in an open market, and therefore, they may not obtain the best
price  available  on the market.  Because  retail  investors  are  consumers
in the securities  markets,  it  is  important  to secure  their  willingness
to participate  in the securities  market.  A lack  of consumer  protection
in the securities market will  affect overall liquidity levels.  To address this
liquidity  risk,  Best  Execution  Rules  require  brokers  to search  for the best
price  available  on different  trading  venues,  clearing  houses,  settlement
facilities,  and custodians  all  in the interest  of customers.55 This  rule  is
important when the two exchanges’ trading platforms are interconnected.
If one  market  does  not  employ  such  a rule,  an intermediary  such
as an investment  bank  (through  systematic  internalization,  SI)  may  offer
securities  to investors  through  securities  it  has  held  instead  of seeking
a quote  from alternative  trading  platforms.56 In some  markets,  such
as Taiwan, there is still a concentration rule which prohibits securities to be
traded  outside  the exchange  i.e. an alternative  trading  platform.
An interconnection  between  the markets  will  need  to adopt  similar
approaches to competition and consumer protection to achieve the intended
synergies.
5.2.4 CONFLICT OF LAWS
Conflict  of laws  risks  can  arise  when  transactions  are  made  by parties
in different  jurisdictions.  In an interconnected  trading  platform,  parties
must determine which law applies and which regulatory agencies will have
the power to supervise, investigate and impose sanctions. A buy order can
be  placed  through an exchange  based  in country  a and matched by a sell
order through an exchange based in country B. The trading platform can be
located  in country  C.  Conflict  of laws  rules  must  address  1)  which  law
governs  contracts  and 2)  which  regulator  addresses  issues  of misconduct
such as cases of market manipulation. Without this legal certainty, investors
will  not  be  willing  to trade on an interconnected platform.  Without  rules
55 If a product  is  tradable  in multiple  trading  platforms  which  have  different  post  trade
arrangements the executable price may seem good but is eroded by the post trade costs.
56 However,  this  duty  may  be  overridden  when  parties  introduce  their  traders  to orders
placed in a particular trading venue.
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detailing  each regulator’s  powers,  investors may not  know what redress
they may pursue.
This  is  the area  where  a harmonized  private  law  can  increase
the effectiveness of market interconnections. That is if contract law, tort law,
regulatory  regimes  are  the same  in these  three  countries,  investors  can
obtain  the same  redress  no  matter  which  law  of the country  applies.57
Hence,  common  approaches  in this  area  can  reduce  risks.
On the enforcement  side,  a model  of a college  of regulators  [i.e. similar
to the structures of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA),
the European  Banking  Authority  (EBA),  and the European  Insurance
and Occupational  Pensions  Authority  (EIOPA)]  can  be  introduced
to facilitate  bilateral  or multilateral  interconnections.  However,
the harmonisation  of private  law  can  be  a slow  process,
and the determination  of an agreeable  regulatory  structure  also  requires
a long period of political negotiation.
6. CURRENT REGULATION
The  harmonisation  of rules  can  facilitate  system  convergence  to create
market infrastructure connectivity. I will  use some of the measures aimed
at forging market interconnections introduced by the European Union.
6.1 FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL AND PASSPORTING RIGHTS
FOR ISSUERS
National  regulators  focus  less  on competition  among  exchanges  within
the national  market  and more  on making  regulatory  regimes  competitive
so as to  attract  foreign  capital  beyond  borders  [e.g. motivating  foreign
companies  to list  their  securities  on their  national  primary  or secondary
boards  for primary or secondary listings  (dual-listing)].  To break through
national regimes aimed at protecting national exchange operators, EU law
has  facilitated  the free  movement  of capital  and competition  among
different market operators across the EU through the Prospectus Directive58
57 See the case of the Common European Sales Law.
58 Directive  2003/71/EC  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 4 November 2003
on the Prospectus  to be  Published when Securities  are  Offered to the Public  or Admitted
to Trading  and Amending  Directive  2001/34/EC.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union
31 December.  Available  from:  http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2003/71/oj  [Accessed
23 September 2017].
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and Transparency Directive59.  The combination of the Prospectus Directive
and Transparency  Directive  establishes  a uniform  capital  market  across
the EU  to grant  European  issuers  access  to European  capital  markets
with relative  ease.  The Prospectus  Directive60 and the Transparency
Directive61 allow  securities  approved  for listing  in one  jurisdiction  to be
offered  and traded  in another  jurisdiction’s  market  without  the need
for further  regulatory  approval.  The Transparency  Directive
and Transparency  Directive  Regulations62 require  issuers  of securities
admitted to regulated markets in the EU to ensure appropriate transparency
levels  for investors  through the regular  flow of information  by disclosing
periodic  and on-going  regulated  information  and by disseminating  such
information to the public throughout the EU.  The creation of the European
Electronic  Access  Point  (EEAP)  by the European  Securities  and Markets
Authority  will  provide  access  to all  published  regulatory  information
via each  Member  State's  storage  service.63 This  enables  companies
to disseminate information in a timely fashion through their home member
states and across the EU.
However,  because  there  is  only  a minimum  harmonisation  rule
on continuing  disclosure  obligations  under  the Transparency  Directive,
companies  with securities  traded  on multiple  regulated  markets  must
59 Directive  2013/50/EU  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 22 October 2013
amending  Directive  2004/109/EC  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council
on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers
whose  securities  are  admitted  to trading  on a regulated  market,  Directive  2003/71/EC
of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  on the prospectus  to be  published  when
securities  are  offered  to the public  or admitted  to trading  and Commission  Directive
2007/14/EC  laying  down  detailed  rules  for the implementation  of certain  provisions
of Directive 2004/109/EC. Official Journal of the European Union. 6 November. Available from:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/50/oj [Accessed 23 September 2017].
60 For an example of how passporting rights operate in cross-border securities, see Ferran, E.
(2007)  Cross-border  Offers  of Securities  in the EU:  the Standard  Life  Flotation.  European
Company  and Financial  Law  Review, 4  (4),  pp. 461–490;  for the legislative  history
of the European  markets  regulation,  see  Ferrarini,  G.  (2002)  Pan-European  Securities
Markets:  Policy  Issues  and Regulatory  Responses.  European  Business  Organization  Law
Review, 3 (2), pp. 249–292.
61 Fleischer,  H.  and Schmolke,  K.  U.  (2011)  The Reform  of the Transparency  Directive:
Minimum or Full Harmonisation of Ownership Disclosure?. European Business Organization
Law Review, 12 (1), pp. 121–145.
62 The Transparency  Regulations  2015, SI  2015/1755.  United  Kingdom  of Great  Britain
and Northern  Ireland.  London:  The Stationery  Office.  In English.  Available  from:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1755/pdfs/uksi_20151755_en.pdf 
[Accessed 23 September 2017].
63 European Securities  and Markets Authority (ESMA). (2015)  Final  Report:  Draft  Regulatory
Technical  Standards  on European  Electronic  Access  Point  (EEAP).  [online]  Available  from:
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-1460_-_esma_final_
report_on_draft_rts_on_eeap.pdf [Accessed 23 September 2017].
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comply  with more  than  one  continuing  disclosure  regime,  generating
higher costs than those when securities are traded in a single venue.
6.2 PROMOTING COMPETITION
IN TRADING, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT
Regulation  can  facilitate  interconnections  while  creating  obstacles
to the formation  of interconnection.  Because  many  countries’  stock
exchanges  are  still  considered  national  infrastructure  and operate
as monopolies,  national  government’s  views  on the role  of and on its
interest —  both  regulatory  and revenue-wise —  in the stock  exchange
influence  the models  of linkages  that  their  stock  exchanges  can  have
with others.
However,  transnational  regulators  such  as EU  agencies
and the International  Organization  of Securities  Commissions  (IOSCO)
employ  different  regulatory  policies  from those  of national  regulators,
which may focus on national competitiveness (how their market operators
can win) rather than on competition at the cross-border level. Even between
transnational  regulators,  regulatory  objectives  vary:  IOSCO  focuses
on risk,64 whereas  EU regulators,  in addition to risk,  monitor  competition
in securities  markets.  The EU has the objective  of rendering  EU securities
markets more integrated so that they can compete with markets in countries
such as the USA. This objective has led to the formation of measures aimed
at the gradual  liberalisation  of the financial  market  infrastructure  sector.
MiFID  I,  by dispensing  with the  ‘concentration  rule’,  allows  alternative
trading  venues  such  as Multilateral  Trading  Platform  (MTF)  to compete
with traditional  exchanges’  trading  platforms.  In turn,  alternative  trading
venues have significantly reduced trading fees,65 causing exchanges to focus
on other  areas  of the value  chain  (e.g. clearing  and data  management
services).  In the clearing sector, MiFID I and MiFID II open up competition
in the clearing  sector  through  ‘open  access’  and  ‘interoperability’.  Open
access  enables  clearing  houses  to have  access  to the exchange-controlled
trading  venues.  Interoperable  linkages  between  clearinghouses  enable
clearinghouses  to net  trade  by parties  that  use  different  trading  venues.
64 Karmel, R. S. (2012) IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis. Journal of Corporation Law, 37
(4), pp. 849–902.
65 Geranio,  M.  (2016)  Evolution  of the Exchange  Industry:  from Dealers’  Clubs  to Multinational
Companies. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.
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To maintain the sustainability of alterative trading venues, open access also
grants alternative trading venues access to clearing facilities.
6.3 TRADING TRANSPARENCY
Trading transparency facilitates exchange price discovery. MiFID imposes
such  requirements  on both  the sell  side  and the buy  side,66 which  is
particularly  important  when  the same  types  of securities  can  be  traded
on different  venues  because  trading  transparency  can  mitigate  the risks
of arbitrage  and enable  traders  to fulfil  their  obligations  of optimal
execution for customers.67
However, there is no agreement on the impact of trading transparency
on market  stability.  It  is  argued  that  although  pre-trade  disclosure  can
increase price transparency, the disclosure of large block trades can create
instability  in the market.  Because  of such uncertainties,  a compromise  has
been made pursuant to which pre-trade disclosure applies only to certain
trading venues such as equities traded on the regulated market.68
MiFID  II  also  requires  post-trade  transparency  and trade  reporting
to ARMs (approved reporting mechanisms) such as UniVista69 can operate
throughout  Europe.  Reporting  entities  under  MiFIR  are  both  ‘legal’
and ‘natural’  persons.  Legal  persons  must  use  a Legal  Entity  Identifier
(LEI).70 Natural persons must use a unique number.71 Firms can no longer
select  their  own  identifiers.  In the UK  markets,  the National  Insurance
Number has been chosen for the UK as a LEI, and the user passport number
for those outside of the European Economic Area.
66 Position limits in MiFID II will affect fund managers who trade in commodities derivatives.
Of course, firms trading these instruments will also have to report their positions.
67 Art. 21  MiFID  I;  However,  over-reporting  is  being  clamped  down  on now.  If data  are
over-reported, the will must re-review and report them.
68 European  Securities  and Markets  Authority  (ESMA).  (2015)  Regulatory  Technical
and Implementing  Standards –  Annex  I:  MiFID  II/MiFIR.  [online]  Available  from:
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2015-esma-1464_annex_i_-
_draft_rts_and_its_on_mifid_ii_and_mifir.pdf [Accessed 23 September 2017].
69 See London Stock Exchange Group.  (2015)  MIFID II:  An Update  on its  Status  and Impact.
[online] London Stock Exchange Group plc. Available from: http://www.lseg.com/markets-
products-and-services/post-trade-services/unavista/resources/mifid-ii-update-its-status-and
-impact [Accessed 23 September 2017].
70 Changes in the MiFID I and MiFIR: a massive increase in the number of reportable financial
instruments, a significant increase in types of transactions to be reported, a large increase
in the number  of fields  in a transaction  report  (24  data  fields  increases  to 81),  significant
impacts  on entities  with reporting obligations,  and (including those of the buy-side),  safe
betting at the moment of over reporting. Certain regulators do not prefer this, but it is not
a breach, whereas under-reporting is.
71 MiFIR encourages LEI use.
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EMIR also requires trade reporting, and yet, the objectives are different
from those  of MiFIR.  EMIR  focuses  on the visibility  of systemic  risk
and position  exposure,  whereas  MiFIR  is  more  focused  on the detection
of market abuse. There has always been a wish for the two to be converged,
and thus, a person can report once to one ARM.
These  regulations  allow  interconnected  markets  to operate  using
the same approach to transparency.  This  can reduce arbitrage and render
the function of exchange price discovery more efficient.
6.4  MARKET  STABILITY,  RISK  OF CONTAGION,  AND ENTITY
GOVERNANCE
6.4.1 REGULATED MARKETS
Market connectivity occurs when financial market infrastructure providers
make linkages to spur cross-border trade flows.  These providers must  be
resilient  to cope  with market  eventualities.  The UK  regulatory  regime,
under  the Financial  Services  and Markets  Act  2000,  can  offer  some
guidance. Currently, ‘fit and proper’ rules; organisational rules addressing
conflicts  of interest,  management  risks,  the adoption  of trading  rules,
and fiscal  resources;  and market  monitoring  rules  are  imposed  through
regulated  market  management  and in regulated  markets.  Regulated
markets  are  traditionally  known  exchanges.72 These  rules  also  apply
to alternative  trading  systems,  clearinghouses,  securities  depositories,
and other  settlement  systems.  When  a regulated  market  wishes  to make
a connection  with a third-country  market,  the third  country  will  need
to have  equivalent  regimes  for the markets  to operate  such
an interconnection.
6.4.2 CCP
On  the trading  side,  default  risk  can  cause  a run  on the system.  Hence,
on-exchange  and alternative  venue  trades  must  be  cleared
by a clearinghouse.73 The CCP  acts  as an important  entity  that  manages
default  risks  of trade.  Accordingly,  the CCP  will  assume  a concentration
72 Investment exchanges – The FSA (29 S;  s 285A (1)  of FSMA 2000)  has the power to make
additional rules. See The Financial Services Act 2012 (c. 21). United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern  Ireland.  London:  The Stationery  Office.  In English.  Available  from:
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/1755/pdfs/uksi_20151755_en.pdf
[Accessed 23 September 2017].
73 Currently, there is no legal obligation to do so for trades on alternative trading venues.
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of risks that can affect market stability levels. Because CCPs provide a trade
guarantee,  they  are  subject  to more  rigorous  governance  scrutiny  under
MiFIR.74 Whereas  CCPs  forge interoperable  linkages  to ease  cross-border
securities  trade,  the insolvency  of their  members  and their  own  risks
of insolvency should not  affect  1)  smooth trading and 2) the entitlements
of end  investors.  Hence,  the internal  governance  of CCPs,  margins,
collateral  levels  required  for clearing  members,  clearing  member  default
and close-out  rules,  and the enforceability  of contracts  involving  clearing
members within and outside of the jurisdiction of a trading venue become
pertinent for market stability. Unlike the case for regulated exchanges, there
are  no  passporting  rights  for CCPs.  However,  EMIR  effectively  gives
a passporting right when a clearinghouse obtains a QCCP status.75 In other
words,  a CCP  will  need  to obtain  approval  from a competent  authority
of the  market  in which  it  operates.  This  approval  can  increase  the cost
of operations while limiting competition.
However, the regulatory objective of market stability can be translated
into  different  types  of provisions.  Market  stability,  such  as market
confidence, is a broad term that can capture different themes from solvency
measures to investor protection regimes.
6.4.3 CSD
The  CSD  processes  the settlement  of securities  trade  and provides
for settlement finality. It records information on the ownership of securities
and may own securities.  CSDR regulates how CSD should protect assets
and functions  of ownership  registration.  Because  European  central
securities  depositories  operate  on different  models,  legal  relationships
between  a CSD  and its  members  and between  a CSD  and end  investors
vary.  Furthermore,  CSDs  have  no  passporting  rights.  Therefore,  these
differences  affect  standards  for their  services,  their  liabilities  towards
stakeholders,  and enforcements  against  them.  For cross-border  securities
transfers,  International  Central  Securities  Depositories  (ICSDs)  serve
as important intermediaries that link domestic CSDs. In structures in which
CCPs begin to interoperate, ICSDs protect the assets of collateral provided
74 CCP – The PRA (s 285A (2) of FSMA 2000) has the power to make additional rules.
75 For QCCP status under EMIR see LCH The Markets’ Partner. (2016)  Regulatory Framework
and QCCP Status of LCH.  [online] Available  from:  http://www.lch.com/documents/731485/
762558/regulatory-framework-and-qccp-status-of-lch-final.pdf/5d274c8f-03bb-4647-a69e-
ecf0000ad365 [Accessed 23 September 2017].
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by interoperable  CCPs.  The CSDR  regulates  the governance,  conduct,
and management  of CSDs.  Clawback  risks  for cases  involving
the insolvency of a member of an CSD are addressed through the Financial
Markets and Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations of 1999, which do
not  allow  a trade  to be  revoked  once  it  has  been  settled.  In terms
of the applicable  law,  the EU  member  states  currently  follow  the  Place
of Relevant  Intermediary  Approach  (PRIMA)  method  under  EU  law,
whereby  applicable  laws  for securities  settlement  are  governed  under
the laws of the country in which the accounts are maintained.76 As a result,
parties cannot freely dispose  of the applicable  law through an agreement.
Under  the PRIMA  approach,  insolvency  issues  are  governed  by laws
of the country in which the accounts are maintained.
That said, private law continues to affect standards of regulation in this
area.  When  a private  law  model  recognises  pledges  of digital  securities,
the risk  regulation  of the CSD  will  be  less  robust,  as pledges  will  not
increase  prudential  CSD  risks.  When  a private  law  model  does  not
recognise pledges of digital securities, the CSD will hold assets as its own,
which  will  increase  the prudential  risks  of the entity,  therefore  placing
considerable  CSD  collateral  requirements  on Central  Banks.  There  is  no
harmonised means of assessing CSD risks.  The European financial market
infrastructure group is currently studying laws and regulations in this area.
6.5 CONDUCT REGULATION
Conduct  regulation  is  designed  to maintain  market  integrity  against
irregular  behaviours  such  as insider  dealing,  market  manipulation,
and other  fraudulent  and unfair  dealings.  Market  integrity  therefore
supports  participant  confidence  in financial  market  operations.  These
regulations  carry  sanctions  against  entities  and individuals.  In terms
of accounting  standards,  the IFRS  facilitates  the cross-border  movement
of capital  through the passporting rights regime,  and enforcement against
accounting  fraud  and irregularity  aim  at maintaining  participant
confidence. Insider dealing regulations aim at creating a level playing field,
and market manipulation levels the playing field while addressing market
stability  issues.  Therefore,  stock  exchange  interconnections  reveal  which
laws regulate and which agencies enforce the law. This area creates public
76 Directive 2009/44/EC amends the Settlement Finality Directive and the Financial Collateral
Arrangements Directive.
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power.  The more  interconnected  markets  become,  the higher  the degrees
of shared  regulatory  and enforcement  power  become.  Even  though
regulations are imposed at the EU level to crack down on forms of market
misconduct,  such  as market  abuse,  insider  dealing and accounting fraud,
market abuse and insider dealing still  require further convergence among
member  states.  Therefore,  supervisory  convergence  will  be  necessary
to facilitate market interconnection.
6.6 LEGAL REGIME GOVERNING JURISDICTION 
AND APPLICABLE LAW
No model law addresses conflicts in the laws that govern interconnections.
Each country retains jurisdiction over activities occurring in their territory.
Home  regulators  assert  enforcement  power  over  market  activities.  Even
though passporting rights allow securities admitted for trading to be traded
on a market outside the home country, the host country exerts power over
how sales are conducted.  The home country retains control over solvency
requirements.  However,  in regard  to clearing,  the issue  becomes  more
contentious.  Who has the power to regulate off-shore clearing? This issue
relates clearing houses regulation when the United Kingdom, which clears
most  of the Euro-denominated  derivatives,  leaves  the European  Union.
Currently, the UK can clear those securities despite the European Central
Bank holds a contrary view over off-shore clearing issues. It is  envisaged
that the European Central Bank will insist on the clearing venues, i.e. CCPs
being located within the Euro-zone or a direct oversight into the UK CCPs
when the UK leaves the European Union. It will not be sufficient for the UK
to rely on the ‘equivalence regime’ so as to allow CCPs located in the UK
to clear Euro-denominated securities.  The rationale behind such a location
policy of the European Central Bank is that, in time of crisis, the Bank will
act  as the lender  of last  resort  to provide  liquidity.  Hence,  those  CCPs
of substantial  systemic  importance  will  need  to be  come  under
the supervision of ECB.
Furthermore,  the differences  in the market  abuse  regime  can  lead
to further  regulatory  divergence.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the reliance
on the equivalence  regime will  be  an adequate  solution  to ensure  market
stability in an interconnected market.
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7. OUTLOOK FOR EXCHANGE INTERCONNECTION
This  article  identifies  the models  of interconnection  currently  used
and the legal  obstacles  to creating  more  integrated  capital  markets  led
by exchange  operators.  It  shows  that  interconnection,  as far  as the equity
market  is  concerned,  remains  a challenge  technically  and legally,  as well
as for broader  policy  issues.  For most  markets,  an integrated  common
trading platform that connects two or more markets to realise synergies has
not  been  achieved –  the exception  is  the Euronext  UVP model.  Whether
the non-silo  model  drives  or complicates  interconnection  at both
the domestic and cross-border levels remains a question.
Exchange  operators  form  part  of the critical  financial  infrastructure
and are  highly  regulated.  However,  different  exchange  operators  engage
in different financial  activities and have different  risk profiles.  Regulators
may not allow home market participants to participate in activities without
approval  or regulation.  For instance,  home  traders  may  not  trade
on a platform  outside  the local  jurisdiction.  This  defeats  the goal
of interconnection  where  traders  should  be  allowed  to engage  in direct
trade on a foreign platform outside their own country. On the clearing side,
few jurisdictions have implemented rules on interoperability or open access,
and this  increases  the cost  of cross-border  trade.  Some  jurisdictions  also
consider participation in a foreign CCP risky when the foreign CCP is not
subject to the home CCP requirements.
On the policy argument side, there are also questions about the impact
of interconnection  on the local  economy.  Would  interconnection  result
in a concentration  of capital  and financial  services,  contributing
to an unbalanced  global  economic  development?  And,  if so,  what  new
models  of stock  exchange  interconnection  can  bring  about  a distributed
and shared economy?
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